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rAbstract
Small-scale fishers in Bangladesh face substantial risks due to their occupation and
their geographical setting. Without any effective buffer against crises, recurring
shocks and on-going risk exposure are major factors pushing fishers into poverty.
Not all fishers experience these events in the same way, however, with some of
them showing higher capacity to negotiate risks. In this study, we ask how fishers
cope with shock, what factors differentiate them in their risk negotiations, and what
implications these factors may have on poverty alleviation policy. On the basis of the
study’s findings, we posit that poverty alleviation in small-scale fishing communities
in Bangladesh requires interventions that target not only risk minimization, but also
the endowment of fishers with socio-economic capitals to help them handle varying
degrees of risk and shocks. Such policies as, for instance, providing employment for
fisherwomen or providing a basic social safety net will increase the overall resilience
and well-being of fisher communities.Background
Sea fishing has long been considered a risky profession due to natural hazards and
technological failures (Smith 1998). High occupational hazards such as accidents while
hauling in nets (Lincoln et al. 2002), health risks such as those from disease (Kissling
et al. 2005), substantial variability in catch and consequent uncertainty in financial re-
turn (Salas et al. 2011), market risks such as increases in fuel price (Andrade and
Midré 2011; Edvardsson et al. 2011), and political and security risks such as theft and
conflicts (Béné and Friend 2009) reinforce this claim. The situation is likely to be fur-
ther accentuated in the future by climate-related risks (Allison et al. 2009;
Chuenpagdee and Juntarashote 2011). Poor fishers and their families in less developed
and developing countries are more affected by most of these risks than those in devel-
oped countries because they have fewer means to cope with shocks and the aftermath
of exposure to multiple risks (cf. Sinha et al. 2002; Fafchamps 1999).
Cashdan (1985: 455) refers to risk as the probability that “an unpredictable loss will
occur.” Shock, on the other hand, is the “manifestation of risk” (Hoogeveen et al. 2004: 4),
or the “adverse events that lead to a loss of household income, a reduction in consump-
tion and/or a loss of productive assets.” (Dercon et al. 2005: 563). In Bangladesh, risks
and subsequent shocks are perceived to be ubiquitous in the livelihoods of the coastal
poor, but surprisingly few researchers have examined them. As argued by Hoddinott and
Quisumbing (2010), the understanding of risks, shocks and their consequences is a2013 Islam and Chuenpagdee; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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term programs to minimize their impacts. Dercon (2010) further posits that such under-
standing has crucial implications for appropriate long-term policy responses, like building
social safety nets for the poor. An investigation of the role that risks and shocks play in in-
ducing vulnerability and poverty in people’s livelihoods, and of the complexity of their risk
negotiations, is therefore needed in order to fine-tune policies and interventions.
A study of risks and shocks in the context of small-scale fisheries in the Sundarbans
mangrove forest is highly relevant because of the dangerous and insecure natural envir-
onment and the fact that nearly everyone is dependent on fishing as the main, if not
the only, basis for livelihood. Seasonality is a phenomenon that the fishing people need
to navigate on a regular basis, while facing recurring natural disasters. Markets function
poorly and social safety nets (such as the Vulnerable Group Feeding programa), even
though present for a few, are not able to guarantee support when needed. Our early
field observations of the fishing communities in this area revealed, however, that not all
members in the fishing communities are exposed to risk and experience shocks in the
same way. They also vary in how they can negotiate risks. Using a case study approach,
we conducted in-depth research in the Sundarbans mangrove forest from November
2009 to April 2010, with a follow-up field visit in August 2011 to examine the following
topics: i) the risks and shocks faced by the various members of the fishing communities
in the Sundarbans; ii) the consequences these events have on their well-being; iii) how
fishing households cope with risks and shocks; iv) the factors that foster coping mecha-
nisms of some groups but inhibit those of others; and v) what can be done to enhance
the coping capacity of the latter groups and to mitigate overall impacts due to risk ex-
posure and subsequent shocks.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we conceptualize risks and shocks in the
context of the well-being of individuals and households. Next, we describe data collec-
tion methods and the study areas. This is followed in section three by an overview of
the fisheries practiced in the Sundarbans mangrove forest and the socio economic fea-
tures of the resource users of the forest. Subsequently, we present the empirical data to
describe different shock exposure and coping strategies and factors that foster or in-
hibit coping mechanisms. We conclude with a discussion of ways to enhance fishers’
coping abilities and the policy implications of our research.
Concepts of risk and shock
Risk is generally understood as the “presence of a potentially large number of different
possible circumstances that may materialize at a particular moment in time in the future”
(Dercon 2010:15). Following Tingley et al. (2010: 1249), we consider risk as “multidimen-
sional and subjective concept”, where a particular risk event has different meanings for
different people (The Royal Society 1992 as cited in Tingley et al. 2010). While our study
focuses on risk exposure, we note that not all events result in risks, and that shocks can
stem from both risk and non-risk events. Non-risk events, like slight price fluctuations of
food grains, can also create a shock, such as to poor households who are net buyers of
food. Uninsured risks and unmitigated ‘shocking’ experience of these risks can lead to ad-
verse welfare outcomes and can cause poverty (Dercon et al. 2005).
Risk can be covariate or idiosyncratic. Covariate risk is an aggregated risk such as a
flood that affects everybody in a particular community or area. Idiosyncratic risk, on
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shock (Dercon 2002; Takasaki et al. 2004). Chambers (2006: 33) exemplifies this using
the vulnerability framework, which has two sides: “an external side of risks, shocks, and
stress to which an individual or household is subject; and an internal side which is de-
fencelessness, meaning a lack of means to cope without damaging loss.” This frame-
work helps to understand the relationships between risk management and vulnerability
to poverty of rural households in developing countries (Webb and Harinarayan 1999;
Tai et al. 2010). We note that vulnerability is not synonymous with risk. While risk is
about exposure to external hazards over which people have no or limited control, vul-
nerability conceptually includes also the capacity to manage such risks without suffer-
ing damaging or socially unacceptable loss of well-being (Dercon 2006; Chambers
2006; Hoogeveen et al. 2004; UNDP 2007).
Households generally try to negotiate risk through a range of strategies, which may
be ex ante (i.e. before shocks occur) or ex post (i.e. after shocks occur) (Dercon 2010,
Dercon 2002; Morduch 1995, Morduch 1999). These responses have further implica-
tions. For instance, among the ex-post coping strategies, selling of assets can deplete
the scarce resources of households, thus reducing their earning potential and pushing
their productivity into a downward spiral. This situation is particularly evident if shocks
are recurrent and are continued for longer periods that provide little prospect to house-
hold to rebuild their assets (Mendoza 2009).
Risk can be insured. Once risk is insured, it ceases to be a concern as subsequent shocks
will not affect welfare outcomes. Both market-based insurance and self-insurance systems
can avert negative welfare consequences in the event of risk exposure (Hoogeveen et al.
2004). Uninsured risks lead to poverty in two ways (Dercon 2010). First, as previously
stated, risks, and shocks, are costly to individuals and households as they directly result in
income loss. Second, a household or households’ response to risk for some additional pro-
tection against shocks may come at the cost of income gains (Dercon 2002). For instance,
for the fear of total investment loss, poor households may choose to invest in lower risk
and lower return choices, and forego risky but higher return production choices (Dercon
2005; Chaudhuri et al. 2002; Morduch 1999). Finally shocks may directly lead to loss of as-
sets (such as death of livestock) that contribute to further poverty (Dercon 2010).
Exposure to risk and resulting shock can also increase entrenched social inequality
(Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; Dercon 2002). As Mosley and Verschoor (2005: 60)
put in “if the poor do not invest and the rich do, gains in enterprise income will be re-
stricted to the rich, with the implication of growing inequality over time.” Women and
children, particularly girls, are particularly susceptible to shocks. Women usually act as
‘shock absorbers’ for the household by reducing their food consumption to leave more
for other members, notably their children and earning members (Mendoza 2009;
Quisumbing et al. 2008). They also supplement household income through multiple
jobs, limit spending, and collect foods and fuel from nature to meet the basic needs of
their households (Mendoza 2009; Hossain 2009; WFP 2009, as cited in Mendoza 2009).
Shocks can cause severe harm to children since families may cut spending and invest-
ments on nutrition and education. Poor nutrition in early childhood can lead to long
term harm in the forms of stunting and lower cognitive capacity and other persistent
health impacts. Adverse health impacts and lack of education can cause
intergenerational transmission of poverty (Mendoza 2009; Dercon 2006).
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The Sundarbans is the largest single tract mangrove forest in the world. It was declared
a reserve forest under the forest act of 1855.The Forest Department (FD) of the Minis-
try of Environment and Forest of Bangladesh Government controls fishing activities by
issuing fishing permits to fishers (Hoq 2007). Fishing activities in the Sundarbans are
predominantly undertaken by small-scale fisheries. These are labour intensive, low in
capital investment, and are pursued for subsistence and commercial purposes or both
(Hoq 2007; Rouf and Jensen 2001). Fishing gears and crafts are mostly traditional.
Gears include different types of gillnets (such as drift, large mesh, fixed, and bottom
set), estuarine set bag nets, trammel nets, beach seines, push nets, drag nets, and many
different types of hand-operated gears and traps (Rouf and Jensen 2001; Hoq 2007).
Shrimp and prawn postlarvae collection for stocking in local coastal aquaculture ponds
can be considered as the largest fishing activity in terms of number of people involved.
About 70–75 percent of the households living along the rivers and creeks of the
Sundarbans are engaged in this activity. Mixed species of white fish, crab (Scylla
serrata), Hilsha (Tenualosa illisha), and Golda (Macrobrachium rosenbergii) are the
most economically important species (Rouf and Jensen 2001). The Sundarbans provide
a major source of livelihoods for about 200,000 fishers (Hoq 2007).
The livelihoods of resource harvesters of the Sundarbans are characterized by high
levels of income poverty and human development poverty. Most of them have limited ac-
cess to basic social services, such as safe drinking water and healthcare. They also lack
knowledge of health and sanitation practices. Most of them suffer long term debt bondage
and face exploitative relations with moneylenders. They generally lack organizational
skills, do not have professional memberships, and have a muted voice in decision making.
Infrastructure is poorly developed and access to markets is restricted. Women are particu-
larly underprivileged and marginalized, with minimum access to income, livelihood
opportunities, education, and healthcare. Moreover, there is no mobilization and organi-
zation of the Sundarbans resource extractors in order for them to be recognized as stake-
holders in the management of the Sundarbans (Mitra 2000; Asian Development Bank
1998). Large income inequality between better off and poor households is another feature.
Incomes of the richest households are six times higher than those of the poorest groups.
Agricultural land ownership is extremely skewed, with only 51 percent of the population
owning land. The average household size in the impact zone is 6.3 persons and the literacy
rate is 36.5 percent (all data in the preceding sentences from Mitra 2000).
The study was conducted in the three fishing communities (Figure 1) of Mothurapur,
Chandipur and Dumuria villages in the edge of the Sundarbans mangrove forest within
Shymnagar sub-district of Satkhira. The fishing village in Mothurapur is located in
Munshigonj Unionb on the coastal embankment bordering the river that separates
coastal land from Sundarbans forest. It consists of lower caste Hindus of 53 fishing
households. Infrastructure in the Mothurapur village is poorly developed, with no elec-
tricity and an inadequate sanitary system. Fishermen are mostly involved in beach and
shore seine net fishing, whereas fisherwomen collect postlarvae of shrimp and prawn.
Some women also do labour work, such as digging land for soil and using the soil for
nearby road preparation and maintenance. The fishing hamlet Chandipur is situated in
Buri Goalini Union. The community has 36 lower caste Hindu fishing households and
is situated close to a paved road that leads to the district headquarters. Most fishermen
Figure 1 Map of the three study areas in the Sundarbans in Bangladesh.
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crabs. A number of fishers engage in marketing activities. Women are housewives but
some do the same labour work as fisherwomen in Mothurapur. The fishing hamlet
Dumuria is situated in Gabura Union, which was badly affected by cyclone Aila in May
2009. The first phase of the study was conducted soon after the cyclone and all house-
holds were largely dependent on food and water rations as food sources and health and
sanitation facilities were almost totally destroyed. We interviewed 30 Muslim fishing
households in Dumuria. Fishers in this area collect shrimp and prawn postlarvae, and
are also involved in crab collection.
Data were collected through individual and key informant interviews, as well as par-
ticipatory observation from November 2009 to April 2010, with a follow-up field visit
in August, 2011. Interviews were done using a semi-structured questionnaire,
consisting of questions regarding household characteristics, possessions and productive
assets, target species and gear used, risk perception, risks and shocks faced during fish-
ing and in daily life, and coping strategies. In total, ninety five interviews were
conducted, eighty of which were with fishers (both men and women). The rest were
with people involved in post-harvest activities and credit markets, some forest officials
and non-governmental organization (NGO) officials. Each individual interview lasted
about 45 minutes on average. As fishers felt uncomfortable with tape recording, the re-
sponses were hand-written by a research assistant. In Mothurapur, the majority of the
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In the case of Dumuria, the interviewees were all males from 30 households who had
taken temporary shelter on coastal embankments after their village was devastated by
the cyclone. Additionally, twenty key informant and in-depth interviews were
conducted with some knowledgeable and interested persons who wanted to give more
information. Supplementary to the interviews, we reviewed secondary data sources,
mainly daily newspapers and reports published by NGOs. This secondary data was par-
ticularly helpful in providing information about rehabilitation activities after cyclone
Aila, and about illegal and unlawful activities that take place in the Sundarbans. Hand-
written data were transcribed with the help of a research assistant. After transcription,
content was analyzed and classified into different themes for theoretically-guided
analysis.
Results
Shock-ridden fishing communities in the Sundarbans
“We have crocodiles in the water, tigers on the land and dacoitsc on the boat but
nobody is there to heed our grief.”
A fisherman from Chandipur.
This section utilizes empirical data gathered by our research to describe the liveli-
hoods of the fishers of the Sundarbans with an emphasis on the events that create
shock exposure and on the factors that mediate shock impacts. These events and fac-
tors are presented in Table 1.We also provide examples to illustrate the consequences
of risks and shocks on the fishing livelihoods of the Sundarbans. Fishing activities in
the Sundarbans are characterized by a peak week (goon) of good harvest, followed by a
lean week (bhati) of poor harvest, caused respectively by spring tide and neap tide
cycle. Fishers normally do not go out to the forest during lean weeks, thus fishing is
limited to two weeks in a month. Most fishers go out once a day for only three to four
hours because of tidal variation. Shrimp and prawn postlarvae collectors, on the other
hand, fish twice a day. Extending the fishing period is not possible as high tidal water
may damage the fishing gear and wash away the harvest. In addition, fishers are suscep-
tible to natural fluctuations in catch. One fisher from Mothurapur described the
situation:
Fishing is like a lottery- catch varies from day to day, one week to another. Maybe in
one day you get bumper catch, but on subsequent days you may suffer poor or even
no catch.
Unexpectedly poor catches or harvest failure in a single peak fishing week is a blow
to the income of the fishing households. The shock becomes severe when poor harvests
are recurrent for more than one peak period, or when fishers are forced to discontinue
fishing due to the number of other reasons such as bad weather or tidal surges in the
monsoon season.
Income from fishing may be further dissipated by illicit acts, such as ransom by
dacoits and bribery by forest officials. Dacoits rob collected fish and crab, nets and even
boats, and often kidnap fishers or physically attack them. At least 20,000 BDT (about
Table 1 Events that create shocks, factors that mediate shock exposure, and strategies
to address shock impacts (Based on interviews with fishers and participant observation
in the Sundarbans)
Events that create shock
exposure
Factors that mediate impacts
of shock
Strategies to address
shock impacts
Risk events
i. Cyclones and other
extreme climatic events
i. Ownership of land and other
productive assets, such as
fishing gear and craft
i. Adjusting labour supply
and using children as labour
ii. Physical accidents
during fishing
ii. Gender differences in family
headship
ii. Shifting to non-fishing
occupations
iii. Tiger attacks iii. Demographic characteristics of
family and dependency ratio
iii. Diversification of fishing
occupations
iv. Attacks by criminal
gangs
iv. Diversification of target
species, fishing gears and
fishing methods
iv. Changes in target species
and fishing gear
v. Illegal rent seeking
(ransoms, bribes)
v. Access to information networks
and alliances with powerful
individuals
v. Illegal and or unsustainable
extraction of fisheries and
other wood and non-wood
forest resources
vi. Food insecurity and
drinking water crises
vi. Risk perception vi. Family cooperation and
consumption adjustment
vii. Illness and health
problems
vii. Type of risk vii. Taking loans from neighbours
and network
viii. Legal procedures after
breach of regulations
viii. Informal mutual supports
and mutual insurance
ix. Social exclusion due
to tiger widowhood
i. Trust, reciprocity and kinship
ii. Occasional migration
iii. Rituals and beliefs
Non-risk events
i. Price fluctuations of
fish and food
ii. Seasonality and harvest
failure of fish catch
iii. Credit inaccessibility
iv. Changes in land usage
pattern (e.g. aquaculture)
v. Costs due to marriage
and dowry
vi. Resettlement
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dacoits each year; numerous fishers are wounded, and their families become bankrupt
as a consequence. A number of ex-fishers said they left fishing because of dacoits and
are now doing vand pulling. With respect to bribery, fishers have to pay a certain fee
for getting permits to fish in the forest. This management rule allegedly involves cor-
ruption, as fishers claim that they need to pay ten to fifteen times the amount of the ac-
tual fees for the permit. They may also need to bribe forest officials at different
checkpoints when staying in the forest longer than the permitted period. Khuda (2008:
6) estimates that forest officials in the Sundarbans extort around 2.3 million BDT
(about 28,400 US$) per year from fishers. The different forms of rent dissipation are
explained by a fisher in Mothurapur as follows:
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bribes to forest officials to secure a permit for fishing, extortion or ransom money
goes to dacoits, weightier (a person who weighs catch at landing sites) and
commission agents will demand extra money at the fish landing centre, then
mohajan (money lenders) may come to the scene to claim money.
To recover these additional expenses, fishers usually resort to illegal fishing, as well
as illegal logging, creating thus a vicious circle of overexploitation and corruption.
When fines are given to fishers for illegal activities, they add another shock to house-
hold’s income. Fishing permits may be revoked and fishers have to take frequent trips
to the district headquarters to pursue legal procedures, all of which involve money and
time, and increase exposure to bureaucratic harassment.
For most of the interviewed households, the collection of shrimp and prawn
postlarvae is a very important income supplementing activity for fishing families. The
price of these products depends, however, on the cycle of shrimp aquaculture. During
the off-peak season, demand for postlarvae is less, and the price may drop to about half
of that received during the peak season. Thus their daily income maybe lowered from
two American dollars to one dollar. Despite the regularity and predictability of these
price fluctuations, they pose a shock to marginal fishers with very low income. Since
most of them are net buyers of food and other daily necessities except fish, fluctuations
in food prices also have profoundly negative impacts on family consumption, thus rais-
ing their food insecurity (cf. Mendoza 2009). The dilemma of price declines and food
buying is complex. One may question why fishers need to buy food rather than con-
suming more of the fish that they catch. In this particular case, it is not only that
shrimp and prawn postlarvae are non-consumable fish products, but it is also rice, not
fish, that is their staple food. Price instability of necessary daily commodities is an
added ingredient to their vulnerability. Fishing households in our study areas spend
more than sixty percent of their daily income on food. This situation drastically reduces
their capacity to invest or save for future needs. After exposure to different shocks, fishers
are in dire need of money to keep their families afloat. The formal credit market is poorly
supplied, and in most instances excludes small-scale fishers from benefiting due to absent
or insufficient collateral in the form of assets. Taking loans from money lenders is also
risky because failure to repay the loan may force the sale of remaining productive assets,
such as boats and nets. As our study reveals, several fishers absconded in order to avoid
or delay repayment of loans from NGOs and money lenders.
Fishing activities in the Sundarbans take place mainly in narrow canals and tributaries
where territorial use of space often creates conflicts and tension. This is particularly the
case with estuarine setbag nets for shrimp and prawn postlarvae collection, where theft
or destruction of gear by other users takes place. Additionally, small-scale fishers com-
pete for space with coastal aquaculture. Canals and water-logged agriculture fields in
the rainy season, earlier used by poor fishers for their livelihood activities, have been
turned into shrimp ponds. Discharge of farm effluents containing hazardous substances
together with overfishing by shrimp and prawn postlarvae collectors has drastically re-
duced fisheries productivity in the remaining freshwater bodies (Islam and Wahab
2005). Much khas, or government-owned land around coastal embankments, which
had been used by the poor for their settlements, now has become the private property
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a buffer for the livelihoods of many marginal fishers. One fisherwoman from
Mothurapur recalled:
Even by digging up holes made by rats in paddy fields, we could collect the remains
of paddy that ensured our food security for at least two months. We worked in the
paddy field during harvest seasons and payment of the labour was in grains rather
than in cash and that was positive for our food security. We could even use collected
paddy chaff for fuel, for thatch or food for cattle. Now we have to travel long
distances inland to find a paddy field to work on, because all farm land nearby has
been converted into aquaculture ponds.
Another issue related to shrimp farming is environmental quality. In Dumuria, a
number of fishers mentioned that before shrimp aquaculture was initiated, they could
drink groundwater and cultivate vegetables and fruits in their home yards. Now, one
fisher from Dumuria said:
Only in the rainy season can we drink rain-harvested fresh water, the rest of the year
we have to drink water from ponds after purification or buy water, because ground
water is too saline to drink.
Health problems often constitute a significant shock in fishing communities. Women
and children who use drag nets to collect shrimp and prawn postlarvae, need to spend
five to six hours per day in the water. These uncomfortable working conditions affect
their health. Skin diseases and gynecological problems are reported for women and
young girls who work as collectors. Many fishermen are distressed by infestations of
mosquitoes. One fisherman from Chandipur said that:
Mosquito bites in the forest are so harsh and acute that sometime I feel that begging
on land is better than fishing in the forest.
Moreover, village settlements are highly congested and sanitation facilities are poorly de-
veloped. Many households still lack sanitary toilets, exposing them to risk of water borne
disease. Illness of a family head and main income earner is one of the most cited causes of
shock. Although almost all members in fishing households contribute to family income, ill-
ness of one earning member can put them in a situation where they are unable to meet the
costs of treatment. Their welfare is highly affected because they usually have little or no
savings to fall back on. Even for some better off households, they risk becoming bankrupt,
as they have to sell assets to meet high treatment costs. Many fishing households are living
in the condition that Krishna (2010:17) describes as “only one illness away from poverty”.
A number of shocks also emanate from extreme natural events. Fishers are killed
each year in the seas adjacent to the mangrove forest due to hostile weather conditions.
In Dumuria, during cyclone Aila, coastal embankments protecting the island from tidal
water were destroyed and washed away, along with vast swaths of agricultural land,
shrimp farms, and homes. Many better off households were able to leave the island,
while the rest stayed in temporary tents on the remaining wrecked coastal embank-
ments. After more than one year, they went back to their homes but torrential rain in
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their houses four times due to erosion. With a very limited asset base, a one time shift
of settlement is already beyond their coping capacity. The accompanying loss of live-
stock, paddy fields, and other food sources seriously worsens local food security. In this
particular circumstance, a vicious circle occurs as the non-fishing families, or non-
fishing members of fishing families are pushed into fishing due to limited income
generation options elsewhere. Going to the forests for maintaining livelihoods is often
considered an activity of last resort, as a local proverb says:
Nirdhon? Jao bon- No assets? Then go to the forest.
One key informant noted that since cyclone Aila the number of men entering and
working in the forests has constantly increased. The Government of Bangladesh, after
cyclone Aila, put a ban on wood collection in the Sundarbans to enable mangrove re-
generation. For this reason, many former wood collectors enter into fisheries, thereby
increasing pressure on the fisheries resources.
The Royal Bengal tigers that roam the Sundarbans are an impending risk for resource
harvesters. In the last thirty years, 14 people have been killed in Chandipur and 10 people
in Mothurapur study areas. According to the Forest Department of the Government of
Bangladesh, tigers killed 120 men in 2009 alone, or about one every three days. Some
fisherwomen were also killed while fishing inside the forest. Some deaths go uncounted,
however, because the documentation applies only to victims who are officially registered
forestry workers. The government normally provides a lump sum of 100,000 BDT (1240
US$) per person to the families of victims but getting this compensation often involves
bribery and suffers delays. More than 1,000 women are recorded who have lost their hus-
bands in tiger attacks in the Sundarbans (Kazim 2011). Commonly referred to as “tiger
widows”, these women have become a symbol of misfortune in the village and in their in-
law’s houses. Sometime they are ill treated after the deaths of their husbands (LEDARS
2010). One tiger widow from Chandipur recalled her sad experiences:
After the death of my husband by a tiger attack, my miserable life started. I took
shelter in my parents’ home with my two kids. Working in a shrimp farm, sorting
shrimps, only gives me 40 BDT (50 US cents) per day. The number of meals per day
decreased; quite often I skip my meals to give some food to my children.
Misfortune also haunts the children of tiger widows. They may face harsh words from
their classmates, for instance, that their fathers were killed because they were “bad” men.
Because of such treatment and because of their poverty, many children leave school and try
to eke out a living by engaging in labour work that earns them little income. Without edu-
cation and other support, male children eventually turn to the forests, like their deceased fa-
thers, putting themselves thus at the same risk (Kazim 2011; LEDARS 2010). Further,
human activities also play role in intensifying certain risk activities in the forest. For in-
stance; one key informant (an NGO official who is working with tiger widows) noted that:
Human activities largely influence the behavior of tigers. People are fishing and
poaching in no-take-areas in the Sundarbans, thus the habitats and food sources of
tigers are largely ransacked. Now tigers are roaming larger areas in the forest in
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trespassing into nearby villages are increasing. Yet, the tiger is an integral part of
resources management of the Sundarbans. If there were no tigers, the Sundarbans
would perish within twenty years due to over-exploitation and illegal exploitation.
The socio-cultural setting of the communities also increases the impacts of their risk
exposure. Although both poor and better off fishers are affected by dacoits, the poor
suffer more and experience more profound shocks. Shocks are particularly biased to-
wards women in the households or women-headed households in the fishing communi-
ties. Women and girls are usually involved in fishing practices that are time
consuming, such as using drag nets for collecting shrimp and prawn postlarvae, for er-
ratic and meager returnsf. Women are usually assigned to the less strenuous parts of
manual jobs and get seventy percent of the wage of their male counterparts, despite
their ability to do more. Limited scope for income generation as well as wage differenti-
ation put women-headed households at the lowest income level in the communities.
Girls become a family liability due to the practice of dowry. Marriage of girls was thus
a common shock for almost all households interviewed, even though it is not totally
unanticipated when baby girls are born. Wedding-related expense may also push
households into bankruptcy. In their study in rural Bangladesh, Baulch and Davis
(2008) find that dowry represents the largest sum of yearly lump expenditure (35%) for
households, and wedding expenses are higher in a bride’s family (23%) than in a
groom’s (21%). Thus the number of girls in a family makes the family more vulnerable.
Due to dowry and other reasons like childhood marriage, the rates of divorce and wife
abandonment are increasing in fishing communities, some fishers indicated.
In sum, for most fishing households, shocks are recurrent, cumulative and transfer-
able to subsequent generations. Fishing households may suffer several shocks within a
short period rather than a single one. This exposure to consecutive shocks makes their
livelihoods precarious: “a single blow can be endured by most people, but when several
blows fall one after the other, then it becomes very hard for any individual to cope”
(Krishna 2010: 18). Recurring shocks make them very vulnerable to further risks, which
may push them into extreme poverty or diminish their opportunities to get out of pov-
erty. Yet, as exposure to shocks and impacts of shocks are not uniform for all fishers,
responses also vary accordingly. The next section focuses on different coping strategies
of fishing households in response to different shock impacts.
Coping strategies of the fishing households
For fishing households in the Sundarbans, reduced consumption is the first strategy to
deal with crises of no or insufficient income. Usually the head of family and income
earner gets the first priority in terms of access to limited food, with women having the
last priority. The proportion of cheaper vegetables increases with the reduction of rice
in daily consumption during periods when prices increase. Taking rice and other daily
necessities on loan from next door neighbours is also a common strategy to smooth
consumption. Diversified economic portfolios are another strategy of coping. For in-
stance, women collect shrimp and prawn postlarvae as their main gainful activity, but
also work in shrimp farms, weed grass from agriculture fields, collect paddy, mend and
prepare nets, collect mangrove leaves for fuel, prepare traditional quilts, work as
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strategy is to remove children from school; boys are put to work in fishing jobs, even
though they receive lower wages than adults. Similarly, girls join in collecting shrimp
and prawn postlarvae. The reasons for child labour are explained by one fisherwoman
from Mothurapur:
There are always income opportunities in the forest, if they can catch a big crab and
sell it at BDT 80 (1 US$), then I can buy two kilograms of rice. Rather than starving
with children, better to earn with them.
The multi-species fisheries of the Sundarbans also offer job flexibility in terms of tar-
get species. During our study period, we observed that most interviewed fishers
converted from catching fish species to harvesting crab because fish catches had de-
clined, while the price of crabs rose. Crab collection also requires less labour power
(only two persons) and it faces less risk of tiger attack. This coping strategy of changing
target species was at first not taken up widely by lower caste fishers who, with their
strong hereditary profession, consider fishing to mean catching fish not crabs. Times
are changing, however, and crab collection is nowadays seen as rewarding. Thus fishers
adopt diversification as way to manage risks associated with their biological and eco-
nomic environments (Minnegal and Dwyer 2008).
Trust, reciprocity and kinship together constitute another coping strategy that draws
on family ties and social networks. To meet immediate crises, such as dowry, fishers
most commonly take loans from their relatives. When fishers go to the Sundarbans,
they are usually accompanied by their next of kin (e.g. their son, brother or father),
who will not leave them if there is any mishap. This trust and loyalty acts as their main
security in their fishing operation (Kazim 2011). One fisher from Chandipur
underscored the issue:
During fishing in the forest if a tiger attacks me, my brother will not leave me, and
he will fight back to rescue me, and I will do the same in his case. If dacoits kidnap
me and one of kin is with me that will give me a feeling that I am not abandoned in
the risky forest.
We heard of a number of cases where fellow fishers fought in the forest with a tiger
when it attacked one of their fishing mates.
Belief and rituals together make up another strategy to cope with the risk of a tiger
attack in the forest. Before going to the forest, traditional Hindu fishers perform various
rituals and worship the goddess Bon Bibi (Forest Lady) in a way that is different from
mainstream Hindu beliefs. There are several statues of the forest goddess Bon Bibi
scattered throughout the forest for worship by forest-goers. They believe that Bon Bibi
is always vigilant in the forest to protect them from evil forces and it is she who can
offer protection from tigers. This ritual practice and associated beliefs, they feel, pro-
vide them with the mental strength to engage in risky fishing practices in the wilder-
ness of the forest.
Coping with income loss by increasing pressure on the fisheries resources is a wide-
spread practice for fishers. Shrimp and prawn postlarvae collection, which is widely
practiced by fisherwomen, is considered environmentally destructive, due to loss of
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users, some fishers are involved in illegal logging, poaching of wildlife as well as in
banned and destructive fishing practices, such as use of poison and catching of under-
sized and berried species.
For traditional fishers, outmigration was rarely mentioned as a coping strategy, be-
cause some fishers feared that it may lead to loss of entitlement to the khas land where
they are living, even if they do not formally own it. Most fishers think that they have
limited capacity to survive if they migrate to other areas. Citing the benefits of common
pool resources, one fisherman from Mothurapur said:
“Here we can stay on khas land; if I have no food my child can at least collect some
fish. If I go to any city, where I will stay, who will give me food, if I don’t have a job
for one day?
Finally, outside intervention sometime shapes the coping mechanisms of fishers.
After cyclone Aila, there was an influx of governmental, donor and NGOs activities
into the areas that brought changes in the livelihoods of fishing communities. Sanita-
tion and drinking water facilities have been improved and rehabilitation activities (like
building houses, maintenance of roads and ponds) created temporary job opportunities
for many fishers. After encountering relief activities and participating in different
awareness programs, most interviewed fishers are now interested in education and
concerned to ensure a better future for their children. Some fishers in Chandipur and
Dumuria take out micro-credit loans offered by different NGOs to meet immediate
needs. Being largely illiterate, they only obtain short-term benefits from these loans,
and often become heavily indebted in the long run when they are unable to repay them.
Few fishers have savings or insurance schemes as a part of loan arrangements. Cases of
fraudulent activities by insurance companies, however, make poor or landless fishers re-
luctant to be involved in any NGO lending scheme. Instead, they prefer to buy food
and other necessities from grocery shops on loan, which they pay off during the peak
fishing periods when income is better.
Although the majority of fishers are similarly exposed to shocks, coping heterogeneity
exists across poor and better off fishing households (Table 2). The better off fishers are
able to elevate their incomes by switching target species by using of different fishing
gears (to ward off seasonality and low catch). This adaptive strategy requires, however,
financial capital to buy different gears and to cover other ancillary costs, as well as skills
that most poor fishers cannot afford or do not possess. Through land ownership, better
off fishers could collect a number of material benefits (e.g. bank loans) and non-
material benefits (e.g. access to social networks). Hence, a local proverb says “Kheter
kuna, durer sona,” which translates to “a small portion of land is more valuable than
gold”. It is thus not surprising that the majority of the better off fishers were seen to
convert their fishing income into land through direct purchase or mortgage. One key
informant from Chandipur explained:
Incomes from forest fishing are diverse and attractive but tend to disappear like a
bubble due to the extravagant behavior of fishers. Those who are able to lock their
fishing income into land are successful.
Table 2 Key characteristics of poor and better off fishing households in the Sundarbans
(Based on interviews with fishers and participant observation)
Poor households Better off households
i. Fishers work as labour or on profit share schemes
without ownership of fishing gears and craft and
land.
i. Fishers who have at least homestead land, or if
living on khas land, have other entitlements to
land
ii. Houses are small with thatched roofs ii. Houses have corrugated GI (galvanised iron) roof
sheet
iii. Frequently take loans (dadon) for buying food or
for other daily expenses
iii. To some extent, have diversified livelihoods
outside of fishing
iv. Higher dependency ratios with small children,
especially girls
iv. Usually don’t take loans or dadon for daily
expenses
v. Widow headed households without any other
active income earners of the family
v. Possess small capital to lend to others on interest
vi. Fishers using inexpensive drag and pull nets for
collection of shrimp and prawn postlarvae without
any other income source
vi. Have ownership of fishing gears and a boat or
involved in the fish trade
vii. Suffer food insecurity on daily or weekly basis;
sometime go without one or two meals
vii. Enjoy food security all year round
viii. Youngsters do not go to school but are forced to
work by the family out of necessity
viii. Children usually go to school, but if they work, it
is for adding income to the family rather than
due to dire need
ix. Reciprocal relations mainly exist within own
community and relatives but not beyond
ix. Usually have reciprocal relations with people
beyond their own communities and with
powerful locals
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ing in the forest. Better off fishers usually use more efficient fishing gears and safer fish-
ing methods than poor fishers. Further, in Bangladesh, the local power structure
controls the ways the resources and help from the government reach the poor (Lewis
and Hossain 2008). Thus, connection to locally powerful elites provides a cushion for
the better off during period of crisis. Those who are locally powerful can negotiate by
bribing forest officials or giving protection money to dacoits in advance to continue
fishing in the forest.
To sum up, fishing households employ a number of coping strategies that include re-
duction and adjustment of consumption, income diversification through pooling labour
and changing gear, illegal fishing, and drawing from mutual insurance and social net-
works, to mention some (Table 1). Yet, the capacity of a household to cope with the ef-
fects of shock exposure depends on the household’s productive capacity (e.g. assets,
endowments and labour), and family characteristics (dependency ratios), access to so-
cial networks, power, and other factors. Unfortunately, as for the poor elsewhere in the
world, poor fishing households in the Sundarbans have less of these attributes what
means that negative shocks trap them in poverty (cf. Takasaki et al. 2004). This will be
discussed further in the next section.
Discussion
Poor people globally are preoccupied with dealing with risks and uncertainty, and their
failure to adequately deal with shocks often acts as main cause of their poverty (World
Bank 2001). For the poor with lower per capita income, unmitigated shocks can have
devastating impacts on their livelihoods (Fafchamps and Lund 2003). This proposition
is highly relevant to small-scale fishing households around the world, which are
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small-scale fishers of the Sundarbans are similarly highly prone to shock, which ema-
nates from both risky and non-risky events (Figure 2). This shock exposure is a major
cause of poverty (cf. Dercon 2010) and in the Sundarbans it reduces the well-being of
the fishers in several ways. For instance, seasonality directly results in low income
through loss of fishing days. This manifestation of shock exposes them to further risk
(cf. Fafchamps 1999). In the absence of formal health insurance for poor rural fishers,
another example of risk exposure is that the death of the main income earner, or his or
her chronic illness creates both physiological and economic shocks, which can lead
even better off households to bankruptcy and perpetuation of poverty. These observa-
tions confirm the findings of Hulme (2004). In the face of income loss, the poor need
surplus accumulation to compensate for possible losses, but making savings requires
“room to maneuver” (Jentoft and Midré 2011; Clay and Schaffer 1984) that the poor
fishers of the Sundarbans simply do not have. The high risk forest environment and
certain changes in land usage patterns, such as the expansion of coastal aquaculture ac-
tivities in their area, put limits on the fishing and living space of poor fishers. Their
“room to maneuver” is also restricted due to specific social relationships, such as caste
structure and gender relations (cf. Cleaver 2005; Borooah 2005). Women are vulnerable
to poverty not only because of their social status, but also because of their role as
“shock absorbers” (Mendoza 2009).
In particular, shocks also lead to the exposure to secondary risk as illustrated in
Figure 2. These secondary risks are evident in the case of “tiger widows”, who after fa-
cing the shocking experience of the tragic death of their husband further face the sec-
ondary risk of social exclusion and risk of abject poverty. In response to shocks and
risks the poor often adopt ex-post risk-coping strategies, which only enable them to
continue to survive (Figure 2). Yet, a number of coping strategies to reduce shock ex-
posure deepen their precarious conditions. As found in this study, poor fishing house-
holds mostly choose to invest in low return peripheral fishing in the Sundarbans and
forego higher return on similar investments in deep forest fishing, in order to avoidEvents triggering shocks
Ex-ante
Strategy 
Ex-post
Strategy 
Protection
Strategy
Promotion
Strategy
Shocks
Exposure to secondary risks
Response
Poverty situations
Differentiation in coping Two-pronged strategy
Better off fishers
Poor fishers
Figure 2 Impacts of risks and shocks on poverty situation and coping and response strategies.
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2010) by the assault of criminal gangs or the tragic situation created by tiger attack.
Taking children out of school, poor nutrition due to reduction in the number of meals
and reduction of the quality of meals are some other erosive coping strategies that
affect current and future capacity to avert poverty. Better off fishers, on the other hand,
employ a different set of strategies, many of which are ex-ante, which might not lead to
complete eradication of the impacts of shock, but that largely offset them and protect
fishers from the exposure to secondary risks (Figure 2). Wealthier fishers are found to
develop risk management strategies that are more resilient because they have more di-
versified and efficient fishing gears and are able to provide bribes and pay extortion
where needed. Greater mobility and greater “room to maneuver” in the forest provides
them with an income edge over the poor members of the communities, and thus fur-
ther widens the existing income inequality within the communities.
Recognizing these different responses from better off and poor fishers, we argue for a
two pronged approach to interventions, as shown in Figure 2. A protection-oriented
component is required to reduce vulnerability to risk exposure, while a promotional
component aims to increase income, productivity, or employment prospects (Matin
and Hulme 2003; Krishna 2010). Both of these policies are intertwined and reinforce
each other. For instance, access to formal bank credit schemes will not only protect
households from exploitation by money lenders, but will also promote income gener-
ation through investments in productive assets.
Given that seasonality and shocks affect their income and restrict their upward mo-
bility (cf. Krishna 2010), fishers need to be protected from events that erode their in-
come. Some key informants perceive that although complete elimination of the sources
of risk may not be possible, some risk events are manipulated by human activities and
are negotiable. Ironically, most fishers said that criminal gangs of dacoits are more
harmful than tigers. Most fishers complain they are tired of having to meet the extor-
tion and ransom demands to get access to fishing. So it is imperative to provide them
“protective security” (Sen 1999), through, among other things, better governance. The
national law of Bangladesh formally favors landless people to get access to government
owned khas land, but acquisition is largely discriminatory and the processes bear po-
tential for conflicts with local landlord elites. Secure ownership of khas land in a suit-
able setting should be a priority for livelihood strengthening of poor fishing
households. Considering the limited feasibility of insurance schemes by private enter-
prises, public micro-insurance of all legal fishing practices can be an effective strategy.
A small premium could be taken when fishing permits are issued. This will also en-
courage fishers to practice legal fishing, which will reduce illegal and over exploitation
of resources as well as serve as a buffer against sudden shocks. Having buffers and pro-
tective security will reverse risk averse behaviour of poor fishers to a certain extent and
that, in turn, will boost their capacity to take on more risky but higher-return fishing
activities in the forest. However, such changes of attitude need to be promoted by
endowing fishers with socio-economical capitals.
In terms of promotion, raising income is not all that is required for risk management
and reduction of poverty for small-scale fishers, it is also urgent to enhance the set of
livelihood choices for risk spreading. Considering the diverse sources of risks women
face and their history of job multiplication, land based job opportunities for women
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ticularly environmentally destructive shrimp and prawn postlarvae collection activities)
would help to take pressure off the forest and also to reduce high dependency of entire
households on vulnerable fisheries and uncertain incomes (cf. Takasaki et al. 2004).
More importantly, to prevent intergenerational continuities of poverty, more effective
ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms are required (Santos 2010). Our study identified some
promising outside interventions after cyclone Aila. Now (2011) in Chandipur, about
eighty percent of children (5 years of age or older) go to school whereas only 5 percent
of adult fishers (+30 years) have five years of schooling. The government now gives
monthly allowances to students in primary school. Particularly, the present study ob-
served that school feeding programs, that provide nutritious biscuits to students, have
positive impacts on school attendance. Given limited means and resources, targeting
support is probably the most efficient solution (Dercon 2005). Following this policy,
vulnerable fishing households need to be brought into the social safety net through, for
example, enrolling them in the existing Vulnerable Group Feeding program which is
targeted to vulnerable people in society. Most lower caste poor fishers suffer from a
lack of interaction and diversity both in terms of their fishing group as well as in
mixing with other communities. As a result they suffer social exclusion. This kind of
segregation bars them from participation in the social and economic growth opportun-
ities in the area (cf. Crona and Bodin 2006) and inhibits them from exploring new op-
portunities. Again, in the longer term, eradication of rural poverty is only possible by
economic development (Fafchamps 1999). Hence, it is important to bring fishers into
mainstream development processes, recognizing their different coping mechanisms,
and including them in delineating risk management options. This implies that it is cru-
cial to provide them access to education, skills, healthcare, information, and credit,
which will increase their opportunity to share in societal wealth creation (Dercon 2010;
Takasaki et al. 2004).
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the risks and shocks faced by the fishers of the Sundarbans,
how they cope with risk exposure and shocks, what factors differentiate them in their
adaptive capacity, and what implications differential capacity may have on their poverty
situations. Our study shows that small-scale fishers in the Sundarbans face disruptive
shocks that are numerous, severe, and widespread and that this shock exposure is a
major driver that pushes or entraps them in poverty. In responding to shock exposure,
fishing households in the Sundarbans have developed a number of strategies which are
diverse and vary according to asset ownership. Yet, in absence of any effective buffer,
frequent shocks create deprivation among poor fishers who are thus not able to employ
sound coping strategies. On the other hand, the adaptive strategies of better off fishers
are more effective. This finding suggests that holding socio-economic assets is a key
tool to guard against shocks and differentiates among the capacities of fishers to cope
with or negotiate risk and shock impacts. Under such conditions, our study submits
that reducing risk and shock exposure should be at the core of poverty reduction ef-
forts for Sundarbans fishing communities. For instance, better off households in the
Sundarbans may not be poor today, but recurrent exposure to shock can push them
rapidly into poverty, because they might survive one shock but not recurrent shocks.
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out of poverty, but also to protect risk-vulnerable (better off) fishers from getting into
poverty. Hence, our study argues for a two-pronged strategy of protection and promotion
to contain the risk factors in the household’s environment, to mitigate the household’s ex-
posure to shock and to strengthen its capacity to cope with and manage risk exposure.Endnotes
aThe Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) program in Bangladesh is a relief program
that is usually initiated during or after a disaster to support the affected people who are
vulnerable to hunger.
bUnion Council is the lowest tier of the three-tiered local administration in
Bangladesh.
cA member of a land-based robber gang.
dThis three wheeled human hauler (different than a rickshaw) is a widely used means
of transportation in the study areas for passengers and goods.
eSeven is the symbolic number for many.
fWomen and girls are reported to have gynecological problems after spending
prolonged periods in water; risk of crocodile attack is also reported.
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